Defence
IAF To Get 100 Additional Tejas Mk1A Fighter Jets — Implications
- The threat, now, is clearly defined, and the military requirements to counter it are skillfully fashioned.
Tejas fighter jet in the Air Force Day parade at Air Force Station Hindon, 2016 (MONEY SHARMA/AFP/Getty Images) (Representative image)
This has been a phenomenal week for the valiant defenders of our realm, for three reasons, all of which were overshadowed by the glorious success of Chandrayaan-3.
First, Swarajya reported on India’s tremendous progress in advanced, Gallium Nitride-based radar technology. Not only have we caught up with the world, but we are now edging ahead in a critical domain which is set to revolutionize and rewrite the rules of aerial warfare.
Second, an Indian-made Tejas fighter aircraft successfully test-fired an Indian-made Astra Mk1 air-to-air missile. This is one of the most sophisticated air-to-air missiles in the world (a deadlier Mk2 was tested last year, and an Mk3 is under development).
Third, and perhaps most significantly, media reports emerged that the Indian Air Force (IAF) will get an additional 100 Tejas Mk1A fighter jets. This is over and above the 83 Mk1A jets that are already on order.
Combined, the three reports indicate that India is all set to get a spanking new air force in the next five to six years. That is welcome news for a citizenry which had become resignedly used to watching the number of fighter squadrons dwindle alarmingly.
Unfortunately, that was the nadir the Indian Air Force had reached by 2019, courtesy a lost decade between 2004-2014 when no new fighter aircraft were procured, and the drive to develop homegrown platforms and systems was deplorably slothful.
From those dark days to now, when a month can’t pass without news of an advanced desi platform being inducted, a new desi missile being tested, an award of a sizeable defence contract to a private desi company, or a desi breakthrough in cutting-edge military technology, is the defining, undeniable change of the past nine years.
In proof, just as this piece was going to the press, and as if three major announcements weren’t enough for one week, came a remarkable report that the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was flight-testing an electronic warfare pod on a Tejas using next-generation Gallium Nitride technology!
So, what are the granular details and implications of these news items? The numbers first:
As on date, the Indian Air Force has placed firm orders for a total of 141 Tejas fighter jets. That is roughly eight squadrons (18 jets make an Indian squadron).
40 are the Mk1 type. Their delivery will be completed in this financial year. These carry an Israeli pulse doppler radar (readers may note that in today’s world, the quality of a jet’s radar matters more than its size, stealth or speed).
A squadron of 18 Tejas trainers have also been ordered. Delivery completion schedule is calendar year 2025.
83 are Mk1A jets. These are a significant improvement on the Mk1. Delivery of the first Mk1A jet is scheduled for early 2024, with order completion by 2028.
Around half the Mk1A jets will carry an Israeli AESA radar; it is far more advanced than the pulse doppler ones which the trainers and Mk1s have. The rest, starting from around 2026, will carry DRDO’s top of the line Uttam Gallium Arsenide AESA radars.
Next is the second order of 100 Tejas Mk1A jets. with media reports saying that these additional 100 Mk1As will be delivered by 2028/29. These will sport DRDO’s upcoming pride – a Gallium Nitride Uttam AESA radar, which is exponentially more powerful than a Gallium Arsenide radar. They will allow a Tejas to land a mightier punch much earlier, from much farther away.
Now, our current production capacity is 24 Tejas jets per year (16 in Bengaluru and 8 in Nashik). Consequently, bearing in mind that the scheduled completion of the first order for 83 Mk1As is 2028, a 2028-29 timeline for an extra 100 Mk1As can be met only if more production lines are established.
This expansion of capacity is possible, and is under consideration by the government. There is talk of contracting a production line out to the private sector, or adding a new line at either Bengaluru or Nashik.
Another option is the unit at Koraput which makes Mig-29 engines. Nonetheless, pending confirmation, we should currently assume that a more realistic delivery timeline for the additional 100 Mk1As would be 2030.
And finally, is the biggie in the works — the Tejas Mk2. The government is committed to 110-120 of these jets, which will bristle with truly world-class systems presently being developed by DRDO — jammer pods, targeting pods, electronic countermeasure pods, counter-countermeasure pods, an entire family of Astra missiles, the latest Uttam radar, an integrated electronic warfare suite, and an afterburning engine.
The first prototype is under construction, and line production is expected by 2028-29. This means an order completion date of 2032-33.
In essence, the Tejas Mk2 will mark a spectacular coming together of various projects aggressively pursued by DRDO over the past decade. Put together, the IAF is set to acquire 20 squadrons of Tejas jets within the coming decade.
Separately, the IAF has 36 Rafale jets, and its backbone, the 260 Sukhoi-30 MKIs, is scheduled to receive a comprehensive, long-overdue upgrade over the next five years. Critically, this will include the Uttam radar.
Thus, the IAF will have 36 modern fighter squadrons, and for practical purposes only 36, since the bulk of the balance presently flying (Mig 21s, Jaguars, Mirages, and the Mig 29s) are expected to be retired in this decade.
The implications are manifold.
This implies a foregoing of further off-the-shelf purchases of foreign fighter jets, and is a sign that we will not wait for the next-generation stealthy Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) presently under development (it is doubtful if the first prototype of the AMCA will fly before 2028).
Second, it is clear from the procurement planning that we will overcome our shortfall in fighter jet numbers through advanced radars and missile systems. Our detection, interdiction, and standoff ranges (the distance from which a target can be hit) are set to rise greatly across the board, in more meaningful numbers.
This is a sea change from the days of Kargil when our Mirages had to come in high and dive steep to hit targets on Tiger Hill, bringing them within range of shoulder-fired missiles (which scored multiple hits).
Now, for example, a Tejas Mk1A kitted with an Uttam radar and an Astra missile can do far more damage to malintent than the planes it will replace, in a more cost-effective manner, in the air and on the ground.
Third, rising Tejas numbers, plus the advanced equipment they now carry, means that they will be at par with the Pakistani Air Force in quality and quantity. This leads to a major shift in operational planning: it frees up the Sukhois and Rafales to tackle China while the Tejas squadrons tackle Pakistan.
To this we must add two allied aspects — India’s rapid progress in establishing a vast, multi-layered air defence-cum-early warning network stretching from the Gulf of Kutch, through the Indo-Gangetic plains, into the Brahmaputra valley; and the equally rapid pace at which the new Rudram family of long-range anti-radiation missiles are being pressed into service with the IAF.
(The Rudram is primarily designed to destroy ground-based air defence installations and strategic missile silos. The MkIII under development has an air-launched range of over 500 kilometre, which means that it can strike across the Tibetan plateau into Xinjiang province without an IAF jet having to exit Indian airspace).
Combining all of the above, in conclusion, it is evident that the pieces are finally coming together. The painful legacy issues of a lost decade are being removed.
Our ability to tackle a two-front threat is increasing in leaps and bounds, as is our capacity to absorb losses in a full-fledged conflict. Dealing with two large, unfriendly, nuclear neighbours operating in tandem is not an easy task, but the efforts of the government, the armed forces, and our scientific community, over the past decade, show that it can be done.
This is a remarkable transition in progress, from a regrettable phase when a leadership failed to respond adequately to a truly existential threat by wishing it away, or bending over backwards in needless, counterproductive compromise, to one where the threat is clearly defined, and the military requirements to counter it are skilfully fashioned.
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