A topical report prepared by Project Alpha of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College made startling discoveries regarding Pakistan and China’s relationship regarding the former’s nuclear programme. The report highlighted Pakistan’s measured tactic of continuously using front companies along with other deceptive methods to obtain dual-use goods for its nuclear programme.
The report contended that Pakistan keeps a grid of about 20 trading companies in locations like mainland China, Dubai and Singapore to covertly fund its nuclear programme. The report states:
While the full extent of their overseas operations are not clear, these trading companies probably purchase goods from manufacturers in China, Europe, the United States and elsewhere and then arrange their export to Pakistan…Pakistan’s claim that it is a responsible actor in the non-proliferation domain: Pakistan cannot expect to be welcomed into the NSG when it continues to secretly and systematically undermine NSG members’ national export control systems by targeting companies through the use of front companies and other deceptive techniques.
The report maintained that Pakistan pursues international companies for nuclear-related equipment by putting its front companies in use, which are maintained by the state-controlled entities in Pakistan. As the report states:
It has been possible to identify these as procurements for nuclear- and missile-related end-users mostly because of poor tradecraft on the part of Pakistani procurers: they use common addresses; common telephone numbers, and repeatedly use the same, limited network of suppliers abroad for dual-use technologies that can be clearly identified as for missile-related or nuclear-related purposes.
As of now, China remains the most significant supplier of all forms of goods to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme.
However, it does nonetheless raise questions about China’s commitment to the principles of the export control regimes which it claims to subscribe…Our analysis shows that China continues to aid Pakistan’s missile programmes through repeated sales of sensitive dual-use technology. If Beijing has intended for these exports to be clandestine, it has failed in its tradecraft. If Beijing is unaware of the extent that its state-owned enterprises are supplying Pakistan’s missile industries, then it has failed in its oversight...Either way, Beijing will need to adjust its sales relationship with Pakistan in order to avoid international criticism.
The information analysed by Project Alpha included trade information, academic papers and contractor sites. They developed a representation of the organisational structure of Pakistan’s strategic industries and their procurement entities. They produced a redacted version of its report as the information produced is sensitive.