Explaining The Pattern Of Terror In Jammu and Kashmir

Recent terror strikes all over Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) display a pattern which needs to be read and suitable deductions drawn to determine options in the execution of the anti-terror campaign.

A one off terror strike, large or small, is executed to provoke and send home a message of capability. However, when the homeland is struck by a series of sporadic terror acts, mostly classified as small (much below the Mumbai threshold), there is much more to conclude.

Recent terror strikes all over Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) display a pattern which needs to be read and suitable deductions drawn to determine options in the execution of the anti-terror campaign.

Terrorists choose to execute their acts to achieve certain dividends that they perceive as placing them at an advantage. In the J&K context, there have been troughs and peaks in terrorist activity that indicate the status and the nature of the proxy war at a given time. The collaborators and sponsors have treated the Valley as the centre of gravity, the focal point of their efforts.

Activity in the segment of the area south of Pir Panjal in the Poonch, Rajouri, Doda and Kishtwar tracts bore almost a similar stamp of efforts. However, the nature of activity in the expanding arc was truly in place only by 2000 forcing us to activate AFSPA (1990) in all districts of the Jammu division in 2001.

These areas all had ‘networks’ of varying effectiveness with resident or transient terror activity. Jammu itself was struck many times in the early part of the Millennium! As were Akhnur, Samba and Kathua. These areas, however, differed from the angle that resident terrorist activity was minimal and networks were weak or non-existent.

Networks enable many things related to terrorism:

– They allow the terror industry the whole gamut of convenient reception of infiltrating groups, orientation of the new foreign terrorists, training of locals by taking them across to training camps by exfiltration and infiltration and provision of safe houses.
– They also provide the capability of relocating terrorists as per seasons to enable high-end activity for tactical gains. For example when the season of the Sri Amarnath Yatra arrives every year the intent is to build up terrorist strength along the routes to strike at vehicles, yatri camps and other logistics infrastructure.
– The last enablement by networks is the provision of leadership, guidance, planning and most essentially, funds.

The terrorist network in the Valley has taken a beating in recent years due to sustained success of counter infiltration, improvement of intelligence and elimination of leadership.

It has also been partially affected by the involvement of Pakistan in its internal turmoil and attention towards Afghanistan preventing the required focus for running the terror campaign. This is true also for the South Pir Panjal area where 16 Corps preceded the success achieved in the Valley.

The resultant effects have been manifold on the nature of terrorist activity.

Low-intensity attacks through local recruits

Firstly, the strength having dwindled due to success of the counter infiltration and counter-terror grids, there is an increasing trend towards local recruitment, especially in South Kashmir. This is not yet so decidedly evident in other areas such as North Kashmir and Pir Panjal South although efforts to do so may be on.

It is not easy to establish training camps to conduct the Daura-e-Aam and Daura-e-Khaas type of formal and organised training that the LeT prefers.

Resultantly the nature of strikes in the Valley has changed. Organised high profile strikes on Army camps, in particular, are far and few. The ones on the Police are mostly in Srinagar city and strikes against individual policemen usually occur in South Kashmir.

It will take some time for the local recruits to rise to standards of training where they can be expected to undertake independent and more high profile operations. They are hamstrung by leadership problems although this may not be a major limiting factor because the temptation to rise quickly in terrorist ranks and be recognised is ever present. This does sometimes result in higher attrition rates at the hands of the security forces.

Vulnerability of minorities

Terrorists usually like to announce their arrival as an entity through demonstration of their prowess. That is why the vulnerability rises of minorities such as the few Kashmiri Pandit families and the fairly large number of Sikhs because they are easier targets.

Recall the events at locations such as Wandhama and Chittisinghpura almost 15-17 years ago. This is the reason the Army, Police and Intelligence agencies must concentrate on the security of the minorities. Young and brash local terrorists are likely to be tempted to do things out of the ordinary. They have already displayed their cockiness by posting group photographs on social media.

Suicide squads are an extreme form of terror. Pakistan has witnessed this phenomenon due to a high degree of radicalisation. While the footprint of radicalisation in the Valley, in particular, is high it appears unlikely that the level has yet reached such proportions.

A one off experimental strike out of frustration, or the need to place the security forces on the defensive, could always remain a live possibility.

The Valley’s roads with dense traffic and choke points would be extremely vulnerable if such an action is planned. The saving grace is that the last major IED attack on a convoy took place almost seven years ago. It indicates the absence of ‘IED doctors’ who are essential in the preparation of explosive laden devices or human bombs.

Mountain tracts of LoC – back in focus

As a result of the drying up of networks and the effectiveness of the counter infiltration grid, strikes in the hinterland have reduced in the recent past. To remain relevant, the sponsors now plan strikes at locations closer to the LoC. Uri and Tangdhar have been subjected to this quite often.

These were areas of transient terror activity in the past. This phenomenon has not been witnessed in the Poonch-Rajouri sector where Army and Police now need to be more vigilant. Another phenomenon noticeable is the lack of ceasefire violations in the Valley’s LoC segment despite the need to induct more terrorist leaders and rank and file to make up the low strength.

Violations in Poonch-Rajouri sector have been much greater. Whether these have been done to infiltrate terrorists or divert attention from the Jammu segment is as yet unclear. What remains a live possibility is the return of focus to the LoC in the mountain tracts and one off attempts to launch BATs (Border Action Teams) to target our posts and patrols.

It has been our experience that such attempts are made whenever frustration levels in attempts at infiltration reach a high level. The intent is to force the LoC grid to revert to more defensiveness. Such actions have to be countered by greater alertness, no set pattern of activity and if subjected to such an action the retribution has to be immediate and strong. There is a range of options for this which the Army exercises but that is well beyond the scope of the open domain.

That brings us to the inevitable question on the lips of all observers – why the Jammu IB sector has become so active? Public interest in this is obviously large being a current phenomenon.

Here are a few issues that need to be kept in mind to determine the nature of strikes already evident from the recent events since 2014.

Firstly, networks are almost non existent. So, resident terror is almost impossible.

Secondly, the twin aspects of terrain most importantly are the broken riverine terrain and the proximity of the National Highway to the IB. Given that this zone was not the target of focus through the twenty five years of proxy war, the counter infiltration grid does not have the robustness nor the most important element which makes the LoC in the mountainous areas so effective.

Counter infiltration is not a common operation in most campaigns of irregular warfare although in our case we have employed it effectively in Punjab and most of the LoC. We will now have to employ all our common experience to enhance vigilance in the Jammu IB sector and possibly in the Ravi belt of Gurdaspur.

The BSF and the Army have to shed all inhibitions and put this together with the Army only being on call. The National Highway is J&K’s lifeline. It cannot be allowed to deteriorate to becoming the terrorists’ force multiplier and enabler’. It offers tremendous scope for flexibility in the choice of targets for terrorists who infiltrate within a few hours of darkness and hijack vehicles or even strike at civilian passenger vehicles.

It enables them to move distances of approximately 15-30 Km on either flank deciding their targets on the spur of the moment. The possibility of smuggling in IEDs and using them with hijacked vehicles is always a live one. Precautions on the highway through much higher levels of security is now a pre-requisite.

The essence of security is in the correct appreciation of trends. The nature of events in Pakistan will also dictate the types of threats we can expect. If the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates or if the internal security grid witnesses an increase in violence the pattern of terror activity in J&K will witness a change.

The underlying principle being followed by the perpetrators of proxy wars is to remain relevant and as effective as possible, even in the face of lower capability. Thus, actions below the appreciated threshold of our tolerance will be the order of the day.

However, closer to landmark events such as Independence Day, or even the planned dates for diplomatic events, the level may go higher by a few notches. A series of low level actions may be used for political messaging rather than a single large action which attracts the ire of the international community.

This essay has assessed threats and recommended measures towards enhanced security but purely from the offensive defence angle. Other proactive measures in the domain beyond public information obviously do not form a part of the scope of this effort.