In Pursuing Surgical Strikes, India Broke The Paradigm Of Inaction

Two years since the surgical strikes against terror camps across the Line of Control is time enough to assess the long-term success of this bold decision.

If success were to be defined as a military assault that caught the enemy by surprise, then this mission was perfectly planned and executed. If success is measured in terms of the body count of terrorists and the number of sheds and bunkers destroyed without Indian casualties, surgical strikes were an unqualified success. Full credit goes to the Indian Army for planning and executing such a daring and gallant mission.

However, a few tin sheds and bunkers are replaceable within weeks, if not days. Pakistani madrasas provide an endless supply of extremists vying for jihad. A few dead terrorists will neither shut nor deter Pakistan’s terrorist pipeline. Despite surgical strikes, Pakistan’s infrastructure of terrorism against India remains intact. It’s obvious the military dimension of surgical strikes is a tactical triumph, at best.

Most certainly, the planners of the surgical strike were aware of the tactical nature of the accomplishment. A single strike, however successful, will not dent Pakistani terrorist infrastructure or willingness. In this scenario, the question arises if it was prudent to risk our soldiers’ lives for such trivial gains. While cynics will continue to ask if this was done for political considerations, we need to go back in time to assess the strategic dimension of this feat.

Since the times of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military dictatorship, Pakistan has successfully relied on nuclear weapons to deter Indian conventional forces from engaging with the former. Emboldened by the nuclear tests of 1998, this policy of nuclear deterrence continued to be refined. Pakistan started using nuclear deterrence as a licence for terrorism in India, without any fear of reprisal.

The only challenge to this licence for terrorism came from the Vajpayee government in response to the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. The 2001 military mobilisation was a partial success. The mobilisation set an undeclared red line for Pakistan. High-value targets like Parliament, sensitive state organs, and highly symbolic targets were off limits.

At the same time, mobilisation without any subsequent action also reinforced the success of Pakistani nuclear deterrence. This meant that as long as Pakistan remained within the red lines, terrorist activity against all other targets, particularly against innocent Indian civilians, could continue unpunished.

Pakistani threats of retaliation with full force, a euphemism for nuclear weapons, to any crossing of the Line of Control or border were seen as credible. Policy makers in the United Progressive Alliance regime could not find a way out of this bind.

As Pakistan deftly exploited the paradigm of terrorism without punishment, India paid dearly. Mumbai is the ultimate example of such atrocities, amongst a string of others.

The strategic objective of conducting and declaring the surgical strikes is loud and clear. India was breaking the paradigm of inaction. Pakistan would face punishment despite threats of full retaliation and rapid escalation to nuclear levels.

On the morning of 29 September 2016, Pakistani Generals must have woken up on the horns of the dilemma, as the Modi government started publicising the surgical strikes. Publicity put Pakistan in a quandary.

Acknowledging Indian surgical strikes was problematic on two counts. First, it would entail showing the destroyed terror camps to the world media, providing direct evidence of complicity with terrorism. Not engaging the media would be seen as an attempt to hide terrorist infrastructure. Pakistan would find it impossible to build a case against India with the international community, without willingly implicating itself on the count of terrorism.

Second, acknowledgement would produce irresistible political pressure on the Pakistan Army to respond in kind. Pakistan Army could either be forced into misadventures or simply appear timid and ineffectual. The most likely outcome in this scenario would be the Army’s loss of face in front of the people of Pakistan.

After cold calculus, the generals must have concluded that acknowledging Indian surgical strikes would be disastrous. Not only would Pakistan lose international support, its military would lose face internally. As acknowledgement became untenable, the generals did what Myanmar had done a year earlier.

Myanmar had denied the Indian government’s first surgical strike. The Defence Ministry official statement claimed that the strikes happened on the Indian side of the border. At the time, Pakistan had vehemently asserted from multiple forums that Pakistan was no Myanmar. Being a nuclear weapons power, Pakistan will respond to any Indian action with full force.

The Myanmar option was not easy either. World powers with sophisticated intelligence and satellites would certainly become aware of the Indian action. That would be a severe loss of credibility for Pakistan. Worse still, the Indian leadership would be emboldened in the knowledge that Pakistan has taken the punishment and failed to respond. Pakistan’s paradigm of terrorism under nuclear deterrence would be shattered.

This option was humiliating, but with a caveat. The humiliation would be private, and in front of its people, the Pakistan Army could walk out with its prestige intact. This was better than the pickle of acknowledging the strikes. Amidst heavy rhetoric and bravado, the generals denied the Indian surgical strikes.

In the unfortunate political cacophony that followed, we have failed to appreciate this watershed moment in India’s fight against terrorism.

First, the paradigm in which Pakistani terrorism operated for decades stands broken. Pakistan’s retaliatory and escalatory bluff has been called. The Modi government has effectively punished Pakistan’s terrorism. While incidents continue in Kashmir, there has so far been no incident of the Mumbai, Pathankot, or Uri magnitude. Clearly, some rethinking has been forced across the border.

Second, precedence and expectations are set. No future Indian government can remain impotent in the face of another Mumbai, Pathankot, or Uri. There can still be an incident tomorrow, but it will be inexplicable to let it go unpunished. Now a new paradigm of almost certain retaliation has been set.

Finally, assured retaliation from India will be a new factor in the future calculations of Pakistani generals. This factor will keep them exactly where they woke up on the morning of 29 September 2016, on the horns of a dilemma.