Insurgency Is Still A Valid Currency During Polls In Punjab and TN

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam chief M Karunanidhi, who was instrumental in reviving Tamil Eelam Supporters’ Organisation (TESO), a pro-Sri Lankan Tamils outfit, once claimed that a separate homeland for Tamils in the island nation might be a reality some day. He showed his desire to struggle for the realization of his dream- a dream of separate Eelam.

A few political dreams are often wool-gathered at the cost of national security, for which a nation has to pay a heavy price. The state of affairs in Punjab and Tamil Nadu has shown us how politics over insurgency can be detrimental to the region.

In a security assessment sent to former cabinet secretary Vinod Pandey during VP Singh regime on likely threats to Rajiv Gandhi’s security, the then retired head of counter terrorism division of the R&AW B Raman had mentioned that the main threats to Rajiv Gandhi life would be from the Khalistani terrorists in the North and from the Sri Lankan Tamil terrorist organizations in the South. Raman gave a detailed account of the period in his book-The Kaoboys of RA&W.

On 21 May 1991, during an election campaign in Sriperumbudur, in Tamil Nadu, the LTTE used a female suicide bomber to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. Raman’s warning came true. The Khalistani operatives working in US had earlier taken few shots, including a failed attempt to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi, known as ‘Gandhi Plot’ . But a timely infiltration by the FBI under cover agents led to the arrest of the kingpin Gurpratap Singh Birk, and four co-conspirators.

Early 1990s were years of turmoil for India. The insurgency in Kashmir had gathered pace. The LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Sikh secessionists in Punjab were ratcheting violence up to new levels. Over the previous decades, relations between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils had deteriorated. By 1990, the region exploded into violence which amounted to a full-scale civil war.

Similarly in Punjab relations between the centre and the state had touched its nadir. Disagreement over implementation of Anandpur Sahib Resolution had made the Sikhs in Punjab doubtful of the centre’s intent. The Sikh dominated state saw the centre as representatives of the Hindus. In reality, communal politics were, in many ways, a distorted representation by separatists to gain favour of the masses.

As with any violent movement, the Tamil and the Sikh insurgency was contingent on a variety of factors, including politics. The problem in both Punjab and Tamil Nadu had some similarities and has a lot to do with the Indira Gandhi’s masculine approach towards domestic and regional politics.

Her aggressive approach towards both the Tamil and the Punjab problem had aggravated the crisis. She might not be deceived by the belief that statesmen act beyond their nation state, but her apprehension of the Sri Lankan Tamil problem colliding with Indian security was genuine. Events in Sri Lanka had a fast shaping influence on the politics of Tamil Nadu.

It was her diagnosis and solution to the Tamil problem that pitched India up against the dreaded LTTE. In addition, her son mishandled the Tamil problem incompetently.

In Punjab, it was a game of duplicity from both sides. It was a political dogfight to gain support for the Congress party by exploiting differences between the urban and rural Sikhs. Indira and her coteries reared fundamentalist Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale against Akali Dal. The plan backfired and Indira tried to counter the Sikh nationalist politics highhandedly.

Politics remain the same

What was true of politics during Indira and Rajiv Gandhi period is true now, even after the insurgency in Punjab and Sri Lanka has seen a closure.

Unlike the centre, politics at the local level view insurgency differently. Few political parties borrow some of the less hostile objectives of the insurgent groups, weaken the popularity of an established government, gain power and political authority by exploiting the sentiments of the locals.

In these two states, it has become a routine to bring up one or the other issues that is linked to the insurgency period. The foremost among the list is the release the ‘political prisoners’. In the last one year, the Tamil Nadu Government has written twice to the central government to release convicts in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. Recently, the central government has turned down the proposal of the Tamil Nadu government for releasing the seven convicts since the matter is sub judice in the Supreme Court.

One former LTTE negotiator Viswanathan Rudrakumaran wants political parties in Tamil Nadu to take positions to strengthen the struggle of the Sri Lankan Tamil people, promote their cause and focus their campaigns at the Assembly elections to create a Tamil Eelam State in Sri Lanka. On the other side, Tamil Nadu congress leader D. Yasodha has urged Sonia Gandhi not to field Selvaperunthangai for the Sriperumbudur constituency as he is accused of being a “LTTE hardcore.”

In Punjab it is parole time for the terror convicts. Gurdeep Singh Khera, a convict in two different terror cases under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (TADA) Prevention Act and serving a life sentence has been given parole of 42 days. Similarly, 1993 Delhi bomb blast convict Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar was released on parole for 21 days last week.

Although the Akali Dal has said it won’t claim any political credit for parole of Bhullar, its Chief Parliamentary Secretary Virsa Singh Valtoha gave a communally loaded statement, “SAD had always raised the issue of injustice of Sikh prisoners and we always wanted Bhullar to get out on parole.”

Bhullar is the seventh prisoner to be released on parole out of the 82 in the list of the social activist Surat Singh Khalsa, who has been on a hunger strike demanding that the Punjab government should grant premature release to political prisoners.

There is hardly any evidence to suggest that these political parties really believe in the violent ideology of insurgent groups, but what is perhaps disturbing is the way these parties manoeuvre to garner support for the former insurgents and their struggle.

Some of the serious issues take back seats and disputes related to the insurgency period become instruments of political messaging. Religious or ethnic identities are frequently aroused to sideline genuine issues. This is perhaps what gives little air to the radical groups who are ready to capitalize on such divisive act. Politicians need to understand that these issues may be prized political capital for the parties but they are highly detrimental to the national security.