Why BJP lost in Bihar but won a landslide in Uttar Pradesh
Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) defeat in Bihar elections in 2015 was attributed by many to ‘Mahagathbandhan’. In less than two years, the theory has fallen flat in Uttar Pradesh (UP). The two prime flag bearers of ‘secularism’, Congress and Samajwadi Party, led by two young leaders succumbed to a humiliating defeat to the same BJP. What made such a striking difference in the two states similar in many ways?
Prime Minister Narendra Modi had got some vital facts wrong in Bihar. He projected the entire period starting with RJD regime and continuing till that election without adequate differentiation. However, a coalition government of Janata Dal (United) and BJP, right from 2005 to mid-2013, was working hard to pull Bihar out of an abyss. BJP, led by deputy chief minister Sushil Modi was reportedly doing a better job than JD (U) in the government. There were marked improvements in law and order, communal relations, and eradication of corruption. Even when the election campaign was in progress, the effects of the good work were continuing. As such, ignoring the period of coalition government gave the credit of all good work to Chief Minister Nitish Kumar on a platter.
In UP, Modi had a close shave from committing another error about ground realities. In the early stages of campaigning, he made laudatory references to previous BJP state governments. But many did not share his perceptions else the party would not have been kept away from power since 2002. Continued attempts to build a narrative out of sync with people’s experience would have hurt his own credibility. However, in a strategy-shift, he offered a personal guarantee that BJP would deliver on poll promises. Given Modi’s stature, people responded positively to his commitments.
Unlike in Bihar, where law and order situation was relatively better during the regime JD (U)-BJP combine than Lalu raj, in UP, the situation was scary. Cases of land grabbing, illegal mining, unauthorised arms piling, kidnapping and atrocities against women had risen to unacceptable levels. In many cases, there were communal angles to the rising crimes. It seemed people were deeply dissatisfied with the generally inefficient and communally inclined police. Yearning to be liberated, they trusted BJP which had made it a core issue.
BJP had also made a cardinal mistake in Bihar by supporting Jiten Majhi and later forming an electoral alliance with his party. Though Majhi had a small vote-bank, his image was controversial. Nitish successfully projected him as a usurper of power. This strategy acted against BJP’s interest by eroding its moral sheen.
There was a critical issue in Bihar election to which BJP did not attend - ‘accountability’ to its voters. In 2014, Bihar had elected 22 BJP MPs (out of 40). People were entitled to know what they got in return. But BJP didn't have answers. Modi, still in his early days, was not able to put his accomplishments before them convincingly. On the other hand, Nitish availed the benefits of the central government schemes, packaged them with local flavours and presented as his own.
In UP, this challenge was greater. This state had sent as many as 71 BJP MPs out of a total of 80 to Lok Sabha. It was their right to know what they received in exchange! Modi perceived the challenge and addressed the question effectively under two clear heads.
He successfully communicated to the people the funds his government had been allocating to the state, alongwith an impressive list of work done and those in the pipeline. These ranged from massive village electrification drive to free cooking gas connections to BPL households. He also gave factual details of how Akhilesh’s government had been blocking several beneficial central schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana, PM Awas Yojana, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana from reaching them. On the whole, he was able to convince people that for the progress of the state, it was imperative to have a common regime in both the state and centre.
BJP also benefitted from two extraordinary achievements of the Modi government. One was demonetisation. It was an extremely risky venture which pitted Modi against vested interests of all kinds. He could convince people in general that demonetisation was done to combat multiple evils. By election time, demonetisation pains had disappeared, and remonetisation was progressing satisfactorily. He gave a complete meaning to demonetisation, saying it brought most black money into banks and action against the corrupt was in the offing. This exercise shaped his image as a crusader against corruption.
The second one was Indian military’s spectacular surgical strike across LoC, which established Modi as a courageous political leader.
Plenty of issues thus went in favour of BJP. But those had to be communicated effectively. Modi did this in his inimitable style. He could condense the complex concepts into easy slogans. ‘Kaam nahi Karnama bolta hai’, ‘Police thane SP ki karayalay ban gaye hai’, ‘Agar Ramzan me bijli milti hai to Diwali par bhi bijli milni chahiye’ being few amongst them.
The challenge hereon is stiffer. That is to justify the confidence people have reposed in the party.