NSA Talks: Good Move, Even If They Don’t Change Anything Substantially

The National Security Advisor-level talks at Bangkok may have surprised many. Why now? 

Taking positions on the India-Pakistan peace process is always fraught with danger; because there will be surprises along the way and unpredictability is the name of the game. However, one thing is clear: you can take positions, but to stick to them permanently may again spell danger. Prudent analysts follow the India-Pakistan equation closely and take into account the tactical ups and downs which are inevitable. Positions thus need to be tactical because the peace process itself is yet emerging and prone to the rigours of events.

The National Security Advisor-level talks at Bangkok may have surprised many but a closer look at events appears to indicate some changes which could have pushed for them to be taken up. It is a good sign that there was an absence of hostility on television channels even among political parties, thus making it easier for the government to justify its decision and the agenda that was followed.

It is important to see what exactly changed after the aborted attempt at the NSA talks scheduled for early September 2015. Many are giving the label ‘secret’ to the talks but I think the government learnt its lessons well; the greater the hype, the less the substance and delivery. In the event, the decision to keep the meeting under wraps and declassify the agenda and joint statement immediately after the meeting reflects maturity and good handling.

No doubt, it was Narendra Modi’s 160-second meeting with his Pakistani counterpart on the sidelines of the Paris Climate Meeting which set the stage for the breakthrough. However, there had to be a much deeper thought behind it and a reading of the international security environment, particularly related to issues of terrorism after the Paris terror attacks. On the face of it, three things were different compared to the situation obtaining in September 2015.

First, the decision to have a neutral venue ensured that India’s well established red lines were maintained; the Hurriyat was deftly sidelined. Secondly, the availability of a new NSA from Pakistan, in the form of General Nasir Janjua, was an advantage.

As a recently retired Pakistan army officer with the full backing of Army chief General Raheel Sharif, Pakistan’s strongman, it spelt a higher comfort level for the Pakistani establishment. For India it meant that for once it was virtually talking to the military establishment even if it was in the form of a former military officer – a quasi-military representative.

This has long been desired by analysts in India who believe that talks with the military establishment may be more productive although it would legitimise the Pakistan army’s hold over that country’s foreign policy. Perhaps India’s foreign policy establishment was willing to experiment with that.

Third, although the Ufa agenda categorically denied the inclusion of J&K in the talks, it was considered a tactical mistake on the part of Sartaj Aziz, the former NSA. Perhaps India’s insistence on excluding J&K in September 2015, as per the Ufa agenda, was tactical posturing too. It understood that it could not stick to that insistence if it meant serious engagement with Pakistan. There is hardly a dilution in stance in that sense. The known issues discussed at the NSA meeting at Bangkok include J&K, but that may not include the politico-diplomatic aspects; it is more the issues related to security, such as cross-LoC and border firing, infiltration and confidence building, something on which the various Track Two dialogues have also been working behind the scenes. In short, the government may not have given away anything while agreeing to the talks.

This is not an analysis to support the government’s stance but accusations of flip-flops on the talks are unfair. A deeper analysis does indicate that there is a need to take into account a few additional inputs from the international security environment which has also changed after the Paris terror attacks. How has this happened?

Firstly, there is concern about Pakistan as much as there is about Syria and Iraq. Daesh (aka, ISIS) has its eyes on Afghanistan, which is not yet stable. Pakistan itself is still very much considered the centre of international terrorism and radicalism. Perhaps this realisation is now dawning on Pakistan and it is no longer able to deflect international pressures. It needs a face-saving effort to avoid the labels which are being attached to it in a much more focused way.

Everyone has been tolerating it because of its crucial geostrategic position. This may not carry on forever and Pakistan has to visibly display its intent of diluting the effectiveness of international terror networks, which it has promoted all along.

The Heart of Asia Conference is scheduled to take place in Islamabad from today (8 December). This is a part of the Istanbul Process which commenced in 2011 and which aims at stabilising Afghanistan from the angle of security, economics and prevention of narcotics trade, among other things.

It is a great opportunity for Pakistan to recover some lost ground in terms of international perception with the presence of ministerial representatives from 14 regional countries and officials from 17 other countries who support this process. The presence of a high-level Indian delegation sends all kinds of messages and that has been enabled by India urging and participating in the NSA talks.

The Indian government may be risking domestic opinion for the sake of larger gains, which should be greater Pakistani cooperation in the management of terrorism in the sub-continent. The acceptance of J&K on the agenda is a placatory gesture as much as is the entire timing of the talks. Pakistan must be made to take note of this if there have to be any dividends flowing from a decision I would consider akin to a good strategic/operational manoeuvre.

The decision to allow External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to accept the to attend the Heart of Asia Conference was inevitable after the way events have flowed post the meeting of the two PMs. The pressure to speak on the sidelines on Indo-Pak issues during the conference will now be off, and the Indian delegation can now work on ensuring maximum takeaways on Afghanistan. It cannot be forgotten that President Ashraf Ghani is once again looking towards India for support. India’s quiet diplomacy and willingness to yield strategic space to others during the last one year and more is now under praise. Its re-entry into the scheme of things in Afghanistan augurs well for its strategic position in the international community. Much of this is being enabled by the excellent decision of the government to go ahead with the NSA talks without too much baggage and with necessary secrecy.

All eyes should be on the Heart of Asia Conference for the next few days rather than on a post-mortem of the NSA talks.