Why Did They Choose Pathankot, And What Now For The Dialogue With Pakistan?

Barely nine days after PM Modi’s dash to Lahore, terrorists from Pakistan attack the Air Force (AF) station at Pathankot, Punjab. Why did they choose to strike in Punjab and how will the Modi government react?

I hate saying “I told you so”; well, anyone could have told you so after the recent run of positive events in India-Pakistan relations. A terror strike or any other terror related activity was expected and it has happened. Apparently 4-6 terrorists sneaked across the IB in the last two or three days through the same area where the Gurdaspur-related terrorists had done so in late July 2015. They waylaid a police officer, killed another cab driver and later sneaked into the Pathankot Air Force base where four were eliminated before any major damage could be done; some security personnel also lost their lives. Air Force operational assets remained protected.

Before analyzing this event’s effects on the peace process, a little on the terror strike itself. Firstly, I refuse to call it an ‘attack’; that term is reserved for uniformed forces which do so upfront; this is nothing but a sneak attempt or a strike at the best in the most disgraceful way which only terrorists adopt. They should not be given respectability by using military terms for their action.  Secondly, the terror leaders in Pakistan and elements within the Pakistan establishment were obviously extremely upset by the run of events right from the NSA talks at Bangkok and the visit of the Indian External Affairs Minister to Islamabad.

The Modi visit to Lahore was the last nail in the coffin for them and the Foreign Secretary talks announced for 15 January 2016 had to be targeted. If the talks go through, it will be a major setback for the extremists and the terror leaders while Nawaz Sharif’s strategy would get a shot in the arm. Time was little and something had to be done; something big enough to draw attention and put tremendous pressure on the Indian government from the ground swell within India.

The terror leadership probably presumed that just like in the case of the Peshawar air base or the naval base at Karachi, the visibility and impact of targeting such assets is larger and their security could be less alert than of the Army. On that presumption, this strike was planned in a hurry, infiltration effected and strike launched. Somewhere down the line things went wrong. Probably a navigation error forced the terrorists to hijack a vehicle, travel around to a hideout in the vicinity of the Air Force station and then launch the strike. They couldn’t get complete access and failed to penetrate the hangars or other crucial assets at the AF station having been challenged and involved in a firefight well before that.

The detail is unimportant save for the aspect of inability to secure the AF station despite a definite indicator that there was terrorist presence in the area. The obvious question being asked is why Pathankot and this answer has been given many times; I will give it again.

To plan a terror strike with infiltration of a fresh group  into the Kashmir Valley or Poonch – Rajouri sector south of Pir Panjal range is ‘no go’; it is winter and there are no worthwhile objectives in the vicinity which can create a flutter as much as an air base. Jammu has enough targets including an AF station but Jammu-Samba-Kathua have been in the eye of the storm and the alert there is higher, especially prior to Republic Day. After the Gurdaspur strike in July 2015 Punjab was the appreciated target. I had assessed north Punjab in an earlier article. The reason? Simply because infiltration from south Punjab does not offer lucrative targets within a short distance. In the area bordering Jammu division, Punjab has military stations at Gurdaspur, Pathankot and Mamun, besides the AF station Pathankot. Hideouts are easier with the forested region towards Himachal and broken terrain of the Ravi River. It is a tailor made terrain for terrorist infiltration and strike.

Let us get to the other question: why was it timed now? Obviously, the events of December 2015 were not to the liking of the Deep State. Bangkok, Islamabad and then Lahore overcame the pangs of Ufa. With the changing environment after the Paris attacks and with some large heartedness on part of India, the peace process was put in place. The question on everyone’s lips through December 2015 was – “does all this have the backing of the Pakistan Army, the real controller of Pakistan’s foreign policy?”

The presumption was that it did, now that Lt Gen Janjua was Pakistan’s National Security Advisor and had himself participated in the Bangkok talks; he is also known to be close to Gen Raheel Sharif, the Pakistan Army chief. With the 25 December, 2015, surprise visit of PM Modi to Lahore, the level of seriousness went even higher with introduction of informality by the Indian side. The Foreign Secretary talks are already slated for 15 January 2016. I wrote then that PM Modi had to be lauded for his courageous decisions because the ground swell within India was only reluctantly in support. Unless Pakistan demonstrated its resolve more seriously by calling off all terrorist related proxy war acts and did more on the 26/11 cases, expectations of total support from the Indian public would be impossible. I also justified the risk that the PM was taking knowing all the time that to secure the talks from contingencies of rogue acts will be impossible.

The question which people pose to those experienced in counter infiltration operations is whether infiltration of terrorists is possible without support of the Pakistan Army or Rangers. There can be no definite answer to this. If someone wishes to clandestinely escape the virtually nonexistent Pakistan security grid on the other side of the IB, it would be possible. However, the onus of securing exfiltration from its side squarely lies with Pakistan’s security forces. How much of an effort has been made towards this is clear – almost none. When a much postponed peace process has commenced after a long hiatus and it is known that there are elements opposed to it, then surely Pakistan has to secure the process by serious efforts to prevent such incidents. It cannot resort to the age old rhetoric of home grown terrorists in India resorting to violent acts, if it wishes any movement in the right direction.

I feel it is Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who is answerable and under pressure. This is not the time to be kind to him to promote his stability; in fact he needs to be savaged by the international community for his inability to rein in the elements opposed to the peace process. The Americans must read the riot act to the Army Chief who probably gave all assurance of his support during his recent US visit where the issue was extensively discussed.

So is the peace process off the rails? No doubt there will much consternation in India’s public and the political opposition.  However, I have my doubt that the government would or should come under pressure. It took a calculated risk and will chart the course till when possible. It still has some leeway to exercise flexibility while demonstrating its extreme unhappiness through statements by appropriate authorities. Although Indian lives have been lost mercifully the event was prevented from spiraling into something much bigger. Loss of even a single aircraft would have symbolized much more (I hate comparing Indian lives to material but that is the reality in today’s world of information related perception).

This is one of the rare situations where the government cannot be faulted for either decision. Calling off the talks will please many at home but not the international community and many more here who feel that this gauntlet the government will have to walk. Continuing the talks will equally draw flak and support in almost equal measure. If the decision is to continue it has to be accompanied by some tough talking which is visible to the world. As a nation we have patience, loads of it, but once driven to the wall this nation also has the capability to throw everything to the winds. That is the message Pakistan hasn’t heard in a long time. Perhaps it is time to deliver it. How that is done is up to India’s expert diplomats and not less by the famed media.