India’s UNSC Dream: Is It Worth The Sweat?

Why India should invest its diplomatic capital in building a south-south cooperation rather than squandering its energy to secure a permanent seat at the UNSC

As India prepares for the special summit of the G-4 bloc comprising PM Modi, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Japanese PM Shinzo Abe and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff; many in India are waiting in anticipation to see what bearing the meeting has on India’s bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Encouraged by the recent adoption of text based negotiation on the UNSC reforms, the four nations decided to meet to give “a very strong push to inter-governmental negotiations for UN Security Council reform.”

But as the PM goes about lobbying for India’s claim to the permanent seat at the high table, it might be worthwhile to ask – are all these efforts worth the sweat?

Afterall, what has UNSC done so far to justify its existence?

Where’s UNSC’s credibility?

If preempting collapse of security situation around the world is the basic mandate of the UNSC, it has not only been ineffective in delivering that, it has also been unable to hold its own permanent member states accountable to the international law.

Not when the US went ahead and bombed Serbia and overthrew the Slobodan Milosevic government from Kosovo. Nor when Washington launched missile attacks against Al Qaeda targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. The White House initiated both the bombings without the approval of the UNSC.

The Council further lost its credibility when the Bush administration formed its so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ to invade Iraq in 2003. Colin Powell, who was the Secretary of State, presented the alleged proof of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in the Saddam regime.

Back then Germany, France and Russia, were not convinced of the authenticity of the so-called proofs presented. Later Powell is said to have admitted that the pieces of evidence were indeed erroneous.

The UNSC’s so-called humanitarian intervention has become a sham. Many call it nothing but a ‘veiled doctrine for regime change.’ Take for instance in 2011 when the Council announced a no-fly zone in Libya directing its member states to “take all necessary measures” to protect civilians under attack from Muammar al-Qaddafi regime.

The West took this opportunity to launch airstrikes against the country and ultimately dethrone Qaddafi. No one ever asked what happened to the civilians on the pretext of protecting whom the West led these strikes.

Ironically in many of these war zones displaced citizens lack even basic aid. In one such report, a group of international aids organizations have criticized the UNSC for its pitiable response to the Syrian conflict and the resulting humanitarian crisis. They say the demand for humanitarian aid has increased by more than 30 percent.

The so-called veto power only serves the interest of each member rather than of those affected by conflicts. No wonder then the US continues to veto resolutions against Israel’s aggression in Palestine while Russia’s veto continues to protect Bashar al-Assad.

China, Russia, US want the status quo

Will this change? The Big Five will ensure it doesn’t. Here’s an interesting paper that represents what Washington thinks about UNSC reforms and expansion of its membership. It clearly states that additional members are not in US’ interest. More members will mean more difficulty for Washington to work through the Council.With the exception of Germany and Japan, the voting records of the main contenders for additional permanent Security Council seats indicate that they will likely vote against the U.S. on most key issues. In other words, a larger Secu­rity Council with these nations as permanent members will likely be less supportive of U.S. policy priorities.

In a recent media statement, Russia has clearly stated it endorses keeping the veto right for the five permanent members of the UNSC.

While it is too obvious that China will never allow another Asian power’s entry into the UNSC, for India to expect that the US and now Russian rhetoric, that they back New Delhi’s claim to permanent membership at the UNSC, to convert into any concrete action will be too naive.

Recent interview by former US State Department official, Teresita Schaffer to NDTV actually sums up what Washington really thinks about India’s permanent seat at the UNSC.

She says India and the US have pursued very different agendas in the UN – a reality which makes many in the US ‘acutely conscious’ that the first consequence of a permanent Indian seat might bring in a lot more ‘friction’ in the day to day business of the Security Council.

This, she continues, although tactical and may not be a strategic consideration, a lot of people find it quite compelling.

Two more important points that Schaffer brings forth are – one, she says there is ‘no sense of urgency’ in the US government or any other permanent Five to bring in India. Two, at no time has this issue been put ‘at the heart of bilateral relations’ by either the US or India.

UNSC is a framework these powers have built over years to suit their individual interests. Each will be wary of any disruption of this framework that has worked well for them. India will have to convince each member that its entry will not be counterproductive to their interest.

In essence, India will have to persuade that it can ‘fit into’ the system the Big Five have created which amounts to saying it will not create but only emulate what’s been there for years. Moreover, each member’s interests and worldview are divergent, India doesn’t have the adequate tool to take each of these members on board. Nor is it worth the effort.

India’s ideological baggage

We also have to look inwards. Have we been able to shed our past ideological orientation and come up with a new framework to engage with the multilateral world?

Indeed, as many have observed, Modi needs to be credited for moving our foreign policy orientation from non-alignment to the much needed multiple alignments.

But how far have we moved away from the idea of ‘one worldism’ – the doctrine that believes institutions like the UN can drive world federation and that they have enough control and resources to intercept international conflicts?

Our ideological orientation of non-military, non-interfering middle path, largely influenced by the desire to appease the Indian Muslim population (eg., denouncing Israel over Palestine), have always made us look paradoxical at the UNSC. Sometimes even inconsistent!  

New Delhi’s hassled response to the Gulf War during its UNSC tenure in 1991-92, was too glaring. It first denounced the US invasion, then supported and let Washington refuel its warplanes on Indian territory, and then snapped it owing to ‘domestic political pressure’.

Subsequently India abstained from some of the most crucial votings at the UNSC – voting to end Gulf War, the arms embargo on Libya, expanding the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, among others.

Of course, post-1998 following the Pokhran Test, India did change its posture. Although the nuclear test invited international scorn, analysts feel a nuclearized and post economic liberalization New Delhi resurged with a new confidence making the world ‘sit up and take notice of India.’

It was the time when new crises in Libya and Syria broke out. India-along with Brazil, China, Germany and Russia-abstained on a resolution authorizing multilateral military intervention in Libya.

Later in the year, India abstained on a draft resolution-vetoed by China and Russia-condemning the Syrian regime’s crackdown on separatists.

For the first time, India’s position on world affairs seemed clearer. But it lacked substance. While its stance on Libya and Syria was known, New Delhi could not offer any reasonable alternative to the resolutions tabled at the UNSC. While we held on to our position of peaceful resolutions that upheld states’ sovereignty we failed to come up with a concrete framework on how to do so.

Today, indeed Modi has been able to lay precedence on ‘national interest’ over ‘national sentiment’. Our vocal claim of association and even intent to deepen relations with Israel is a testimony to that.

But from Crimea to Ukraine we continue to play our ‘balanced’ game. Whereas the world, with India’s strength of being able to court divergent powers from Russia to the US, expects us to play a greater role.   

No wonder then that the EU decided to approach India to mediate with Russia over Ukraine (much to Moscow’s scorn). But the point is with the strength of world power relations at our disposal do we have the strategy in place to defuse such a situation? Afterall whatever may be said of Russia’s involvement in Syria today, in 2013 when the Assad regime used chemical weapons, it was Russia that defused the situation between the West and Syria.    

India still has a long way to go to display not only a decisive position on world affairs but also come up with a definitive framework in response to the challenges the world is facing. In that sense, we might not be prepared yet for a permanent seat in any high table.  

Invest in south – south cooperation

What will make sense for India instead is to invest its diplomatic capital in the south – south cooperation. In UNSC while Russia and China are mostly seen as partners endorsing or vetoing resolutions together, in the global south they are rapidly becoming competitors. A case in point is China’s pivot to Central Asia and how Moscow views that as a risk of losing its long time sphere of influence.  

While a non-committal support is what India, at best, can expect from Moscow for its permanent membership at UNSC, in south-south cooperation, Russia will ensure that New Delhi is onboard to create the required counterbalance to China. Its support for full membership of India at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) speaks volumes in that line.

Russia is also expanding its relations with Southeast Asian countries including with ones at odds with China. Recently Vietnam, a co-claimant in the South China Sea, bought a Russian submarine. Obviously Beijing would have noted that.  

Interestingly a lot of Central Asian countries too want India to play just the same role – that of a balancer against a possible Russian or Chinese design to dominate the region. An SCO membership will also mean a lot for India’s security interests as well. And when stakes are high India could use the Organization to maneuver against its irritant in the western border.

While in the UNSC, it is all about how well India can ‘fit into’ a preordained order, at BRICS it is all about ‘creating’ a new framework. India as a founding member sharing equal rights with other BRICS members can have a considerable scope and say in how to curate responses to different world affairs.

Indeed, China again is a key investor and trader with all the nations more so with South Africa and Brazil. But in both cases trade is heavily tilting in China’s favor.

Brazil’s manufacturing has been specifically hit by the cheap Chinese goods inducing President Dilma Rousseff’s, during her previous tenure, to enact import tariffs on some industrial goods.

Beijing’s African investment too has come under scanner for issues related to environment. Both countries will look to India as a balancing factor against a hegemon like China.

So while ‘balance’ is seen as a weakness in the context of UNSC, it becomes India’s key strength in the global south that has been wary of the legacy of domination by expansionist nations. One of the good things that our ‘non-aligned’ days has given us is a worldwide reputation for being strategically autonomous. South-south cooperation is where we play that card.