King’s College Report Reveals Pakistan’s Deception On Nuclear Programme, China’s Collusion

While the full extent of their overseas operations are not clear, these trading companies probably purchase goods from manufacturers in China, Europe, the United States and elsewhere and then arrange their export to Pakistan…Pakistan’s claim that it is a responsible actor in the non-proliferation domain: Pakistan cannot expect to be welcomed into the NSG when it continues to secretly and systematically undermine NSG members’ national export control systems by targeting companies through the use of front companies and other deceptive techniques.

It has been possible to identify these as procurements for nuclear- and missile-related end-users mostly because of poor tradecraft on the part of Pakistani procurers: they use common addresses; common telephone numbers, and repeatedly use the same, limited network of suppliers abroad for dual-use technologies that can be clearly identified as for missile-related or nuclear-related purposes.

However, it does nonetheless raise questions about China’s commitment to the principles of the export control regimes which it claims to subscribe…Our analysis shows that China continues to aid Pakistan’s missile programmes through repeated sales of sensitive dual-use technology. If Beijing has intended for these exports to be clandestine, it has failed in its tradecraft. If Beijing is unaware of the extent that its state-owned enterprises are supplying Pakistan’s missile industries, then it has failed in its oversight...Either way, Beijing will need to adjust its sales relationship with Pakistan in order to avoid international criticism.