Part III: The Anatomy Of Israel-Palestine Conflict And Why Peace Attempts Failed

In the last two parts of this series, we looked at the facts of the formation of the country of Israel and its survival. In third and final part of this series, we will analyze the reasons behind the failure of peace talks, and perceptions of hardening Israeli stance, and lessons that can be learnt.

You can read Part I here, and Part II here.

The failure of peace

In 1956, an Israeli defence in-charge was killed in an ambush near Gaza by "shepherds" who invaded the fields. The eulogy given by Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan at his grave describes the tragedy of Arab-Israeli relations:

“Let's not blame the murderers today. What can we say against their intense hatred? Eight years of sitting in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, in which their eyes see as we farm the land and villages where they and their forefathers were sitting...

It's not of the Arabs of Gaza, that we ask Roy's blood. How did we shut our eyes of looking acutely in our own fate, to see the full brutality of our destiny? Did we forget that this group of youths sitting in Nahal Oz, carry on their shoulders the heavy Gates of Gaza, which block the crammed hundreds of thousands of eyes and hands praying for our weakness, in order to tear us apart? We all know that in order to eliminate the hope to destroy us, we must be, morning and evening, prepared and armed. We are the generation of Settlement, and without steel helmets and the barrel of the cannon we can not plant a tree and build a House...

This is our lives' default – to be prepared and strong, rigid and tough, for when the sword will drop - we will fall and die...”

Dayan’s comments show how the conflict with Palestinians was seen as an existential one by the Israelis, not in the least due to strong ideological commitment of annihilating Jews voiced by Arab leaders again and again.

The conflict was made a zero sum game by those in power.

After losing the 1948 war, the Arab states in 1964, in the first Arab Summit conference in Cairo decided to establish a Palestinian organisation, which eventually led to the creation of the PLO. Another decision was to establish a United Arab Command that would conduct the war against Israel in the future. The third decision was to divert the sources of the Jordan River.

The idea was to continue a low intensity warfare (including sponsoring cross-border terrorism) against Israel, but it turned to full scale war in 1967.

When Egypt, backed by Soviet Union, closed the Strait of Tiran for Israel, Aharon Yariv, it’s head of the Intelligence core, said to the then Israeli prime minister:

“If Israel does not respond to the close of the straits - there will no longer be any credibility and value to Israel's deterrence ability. Arab countries will interpret Israel's weakness as an opportunity to harass its security and existence."

Author Shapiro describes how the Israelis saw the war:

“People believed there will be destruction if we don't succeed in the war. Believed in annihilation, if we won't win. They feared. The Holocaust has given or bequeathed this idea. This idea was concrete to each person who grew up in the country, even if he didn't go through the Holocaust, only heard and read... I remember that a few days before the war, I called my company (Platoon). I wanted to say something to my men... And as I spoke, I needed this historical analogy between what is at stake and what was in the past.."

In response to Arab leader’s “no Israel” stance, Israel came up with its own strategy of not letting go off any transgressions unpunished. Turning the ‘land for peace’ formula on its head, Israeli government decided to penalise transgressors with a capture of their land.

This strategy had its own success.

For example, the peace agreement with Egypt. Egypt was brought to the negotiating table not in the least by its desire to recover Sinai - a vast area of land captured by Israelis causing great humiliation to them.

The peace based on interests also proved durable.

Egyptian leader Sadat, the architect of peace, was assassinated; Israel went to war with the PLO in Lebanon; Arab Spring occurred and Mubarak was overthrown; followed by the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the peace between Israel and Egypt remained stable.

Egypt and Israel also had another common goal - the struggle against Islamists - and secretly cooperated over it. Both also found common ground in maintaining good relations with USA as well as against Iran nuclearization.

Peace by pieces

Israel has followed the same strategy of individually dealing with countries/groups to come at a working arrangement based on mutual interests. The agreement with Syria signed in 1974 that has lasted for over 40 years in governing the relationship between Israel and Syria.

The US tried reconvene the International Geneva Conference for a comprehensive peace between Arab and Israelis. But either side had its reservations.

From Israel’s point of view, a comprehensive peace is just impractical - negotiation with all of its Arab neighbors at one and the same time (with each having its own personal agenda apart from the Palestinian issue) wouldn’t go anywhere.

Egypt also saw the international conference as a symbolic formality and not a place where serious bilateral negotiations can take place. The Syrians actually wanted an international conference and a joint Arab delegation, but largely to block Egypt advances. PLO also supported the conference, mostly for bolstering their own position as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

All Arab countries had their own agenda, and Israel was able to form clandestine agreements with different Arab countries over time. The support of United States meant that different Arab countries were incentivised to form a working relationship with Israel in the post-USSR unipolar world.

What about the leadership of Palestinian people themselves?

The Palestinian leadership was constantly undercut by leaders of the Arab countries as well as rival extremists. In November 1988, the PLO took the historical step of accepting two UN resolutions that the Palestinians had never accepted in the past - resolution 242, and the Partition Resolution of 1947.

Thus, in 1988, we see, for the first time, Palestinians accepting two state solution ( inherent in it the acceptance of Israel), albeit with reservations.

PLO tried to eclipse the local, especially Islamist leadership in West Bank and Gaza, and directly negotiated with Israel. This resulted in Oslo Accords 1993. As we noted in the last part, the Accords failed, due to mutual distrust and an ability to reign in the extremists by both the sides.

Another attempt was Camp David in 2000. But that too failed because both sides couldn’t come to a reasonable give and take. This marked the irreversible weakening of the PLO and strengthening of the Islamists.

One can also clearly see that Palestinians have paid the price of outside interference in their struggle. A disappointment with the leadership of Arab countries and failure to launch own sustained leadership has driven Palestinians towards Islamist terrorists for whom peace with Jews is impossible and perpetual struggle against them is a religious duty, but that too has its own costs.

The limits of negative peace

Israel, under its agreement with Egypt, was returning very concrete assets - the vast territory of Sinai and oil fields, towns, air bases. In return, it expected Egypt to move towards a normalisation of ties - a network of people, institutions, who have a vested interest in keeping the peace. This would, of course, require limits on the anti-Israeli propaganda. However, that didn’t happen.

The Peace did not result in emergence of any significant voices which could end the ideological hatred and prepare the ground for an ideological transformation which could eventually lead to the solution of Israeli-Palestine problem.

Without an ideological basis for peace, any attempts at negotiation with Israel are seen as capitulation.

Meanwhile, Israel has come to much stronger than the days of its formation. It is now much more confident in dealing with the security threats. In the early days, Israeli leadership believed that eventually, the Arab states, armed with Soviet technology, will be able to overpower Israel. Hence, the decision to acquire nuclear power.

However, since the Six Day war of 1967, the Arab world has seen a steady decline, with a series of political as well as socioeconomic crises. In the Middle East, therefore, non-Arab players have become significant - Iran, Turkey, Israel - apart from numerous non-state actors including terror groups.

Most states in the Middle East face the challenge from modernity (Arab Spring) as well as sectarianism and tribalism. Therefore, Israel doesn’t face a challenge from the a uniform and united Arab world predicted by the pan-Arabism of the 20th century.

However, the recent flare up shows that the Palestinian cause is not yet over, coming soon after Israel signing Abraham Accords with four Arab nations. Israel has to take care of not only the millions of Palestinians that live in West Bank and Gaza, but also the Arabs within its borders which comprise 20 per cent of its population.

While India along with many other countries keeps reiterating two-state solution by the UN, the ideological landscape is filled with the opposite rhetoric.

Israel has good reasons to believe that an independent Palestinian state would only increase its attacks on Israel, provide sanctuary to terrorists, and work to wipe out the Jews, as stated by popular extremist leaders time and again. The threat of war that Israel has been able to fend off from the Arab states will re-emerge. There is a serious lack of trust, and a more serious lack of courageous peacemakers who can take steps to build it.

Also read: Part II: How Israel Survived Amidst Hostile Neighbours And Terror Group Sanctuaries Across The Border