Five Years After The Split, INLD And JJP Desperately Need A Patch-Up

On 9 April, Jannayak Janta Party (JJP) president Ajay Singh Chautala said he was ready to merge his party with the parent party Indian National Lok Dal (INLD). It all depends on whether Om Prakash Chautala, his father and INLD chief, extends an invitation.

Meanwhile, his brother, Abhay Singh Chautala, who is the INLD general secretary, said the JJP was making a merger attempt only because people were leaving their party. He also asked for an explanation on why Ajay and his sons left INLD to form the JJP.

Why Did INLD Break?

INLD, founded by former deputy prime minister Choudhary Devi Lal, was once the single-largest regional party in Haryana. After his demise, Lal’s son Om Prakash Chautala took charge.

Problems began in 2013 when Om Prakash and his son Ajay were convicted for corruption in the Junior Basic Teachers scam. The party's command was then transferred to Abhay, Om Prakash's other son.

In the 2014 general election, Dushyant Chautala, Ajay Chautala’s son, won Hisar by defeating Kuldeep Bishnoi.

Dushyant’s victory is said to have given rise to two factions in the party — one led by Dushyant and the other by his uncle Abhay. The infighting led to a decrease in the party's seat share in the 2014 assembly election.

The final nail in the coffin was the heckling of Abhay in the 2018 Gohana rally of INLD. Party cadre then raised slogans in support of Dushyant. He and his younger brother Digvijay Chautala, then head of the Indian National Students’ Organisation, the party’s student wing, were held responsible.

Both were expelled from the party, but received support from their father Ajay, who was also expelled later. On 9 December 2018, they came together to form the JJP in the Jind district of Haryana.

INLD Loss, JJP Gain

The immediate consequences of the split were somewhat shocking for INLD.

In the 2019 general election, the party finished fifth and fourth in six and four constituencies, respectively. A lot of members of legislative assembly (MLAs) also defected, leaving INLD with the support of only five MLAs in the assembly, instead of the 19 it secured in the 2014 assembly election.

In the 2019 assembly election, which followed the national election that year, INLD was left with only one MLA.

On the other hand, the JJP did better in both elections. While the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) whitewashed the elections, the JJP finished at the third spot in three of the seven seats it contested.

In the assembly election later that year, the JJP secured 10 seats and later joined the BJP in a post-poll alliance. The electoral compulsion resulted in Dushyant getting the post of deputy chief minister in the Manohar Lal Cabinet.

The JJP and Dushyant were assisted by the division of Jat votes (26-28 per cent) and that Dushyant was fresh blood.

INLD’s split did provide an option for the BJP, JJP, and Congress to get Jats on their side, but the Congress failed. Dushyant presented himself as the true heir of Devi Lal’s legacy, leading to the galvanisation of Jats in his favour.

Youth also got pulled towards the JJP in support of Dushyant. The BJP also witnessed a substantial increase in Jat votes, especially in the 2019 general election.

Coalition Consequence

In the 2019 general election, 42.4 per cent of Jat votes went to the BJP, falling to 33.7 per cent in the assembly election. On the contrary, the JJP saw an increase in its Jat vote share. That’s why the post-poll coalition with the JJP was beneficial for the BJP — the JJP would cushion any impact created by the BJP’s emphasis on Other Backward Class (OBC) voters.

But for the JJP, it was a disaster in the making. Since 2019, multitudes of BJP decisions, like not granting reservation to Jats, replacing O P Dhankar as the state chief, its stand against farmers’ protest 1.0, the 'Jat vs outsiders' narrative in the wrestlers’ protest, and the excessive policing of Haryana farmers to prevent them from crossing over the state boundary during the attempted farmers’ protest 2.0, did not bode well for the Jats.

The JJP’s inability to avoid such harakiri proved to be costly. Dushyant and Ajay are now seen as people caring more for their political ambition than the community. The anger has reached such levels that both were heckled during election campaigning — Dushyant in Hisar’s Nara village, while Ajay in Bhiwani’s Kungar village.

If the top leaders are facing this much pressure, imagine the state of other leaders and workers of the party.

The JJP’s problem has been compounded by its key office-bearers resigning in hoards. It began with the stepping down of general secretary Kamlesh Saini and Haryana unit chief Nishan Singh. A few days later, former JJP state women's secretary Mamata Kataria and MLA Jogi Ram Sihag also quit.

Weeks after the formation of the Naib Saini government, the JJP seems to have realised its follies of alienating its core vote bank.

INLD In Tatters

When INLD identified that Jat voters are drifting away from it, the party looked to non-Jat votes, especially Dalits (nearly one-fifth of the state population) by aligning with the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). But the party failed on multiple occasions. Even when they reached an agreement, moving away from what Manish Grover termed as a ‘marriage of convenience’ was only weeks away.

These developments even convinced swing Jat voters to move towards the JJP.

Midway through the BJP-JJP government, Jats’ discontentment was an opportunity for INLD to cash in. But the space was occupied by former Congress chief minister Bhupinder Singh Hooda and his son Deepender Hooda, a Rajya Sabha member.

The rise once again of the Hooda family is the biggest reason why INLD’s attempt to become part of the Indian National Developmental Inclusive (INDI) Alliance failed. Hoodas fear that giving a platform to INDI would be akin to promoting them among Jat voters, an assessment based on political reality.

The situation is critical for both INLD and JJP. They have both announced in haste that they will be fielding 10 candidates each, certainly not a healthy strategy. They will only act as 'vote katwa' for each other, ultimately benefiting the Congress and BJP.

Elections bring compulsions and compulsions bring compromises. For Ajay Singh Chautala and Abhay Singh Chautala, the 2024 general election is one such moment where they either perform or perish.

If not a merger, an alliance would be beneficial for both of them.