How Modi Lost The JNU Battle: With Troops Like These, Who Needs Enemies?

Modi has to take control of his troops. His Sanghi allies react with anger and emotion to every provocation. Cold calculation needs to replace hot-headed responses to emotive issues like the sloganeering at JNU.

The BJP has lost the battle of JNU. It has pulled defeat from the jaws of victory by losing control of both the actions of its own troops and the narrative emanating from the anti-national sloganeering of some groups inside the Jawaharlal Nehru University campus last week. It has converted a potential villain into a national hero, thanks to the violence unleashed by lawless lawyers on Kanhaiya Kumar, the JNU Students Union President, and the media. That some of these lawyers are obviously linked directly to the BJP is the kiss of death to whatever moral victory the BJP could have hoped to claim from exposing the provocative sloganeering at JNU.

The only alternative for the BJP, if it ever hopes to win the war after losing this battle, is to accept its mistakes, take corrective action, and drop the sedition case against Kumar, using the figleaf of the latter’s statement about his faith in the Indian constitution, and his rejection of anti-national sloganeering.

Consider the BJP’s losses: it has lost the support of media (never an ally), and now even that of the Supreme Court after allowing mayhem in the premises of the Patiala House courts. More than anything else, it has lost credibility. The Delhi police is seen as the villain now, not least because it comes directly under the home ministry and was not seen to be acting to prevent the Patiala House violence. The only consolation is that no one was seriously hurt. Imagine the damage if someone was killed or maimed.

If Narendra Modi seriously expects to win hearts and minds, and wants to win 2019 badly, he has to take direct responsibility for this moral defeat. And he has to change course by recognising the mistakes being made. Here are the obvious ones.

First, Modi has adopted his Gujarat strategy where he comes out of political hibernation a year before elections and concentrates on his job for the remaining four. But what happens in states usually does not matter to the national and international media. What worked in Gujarat won’t work in Delhi, for the national capital is the only place where the media is hyperactive, and most of it is anti-Modi. This means Modi has to be more proactive in making his views known on issues. In the JNU case, he needs to make a sincere and comprehensive statement on where he stands. In this, he needs to learn from Arvind Kejriwal, who is constantly communicating with his constituencies and correcting his mistakes openly when he recognises them.

Second, he simply has to choose the right generals. If he does not trust Rajnath Singh, he should shift him to a portfolio that gives him independent charge while not coming in the way of Modi’s plans. The home ministry has a big role to play in Delhi, both the state and the centre, due to the fact that the police comes under it, and whatever happens in this ministry will ricochet on Modi. If Arun Jaitley is not the man to run the finance ministry, it is not too late to change him. Jaitley is the most competent communicator in the ministry, and he can be used more effectively as the public face of the ministry and manage the media. If Smriti Irani is not doing a great job at HRD, she needs to be moved more to a political role, where she is surely feisty and courageous. The job of the PM is to use the right talent in the right place, or else he will pay for it. If a minister screws up, Modi will be blamed, especially given his larger-than-life image as a one-man show. The buck stops with him. He now needs to focus on bringing in competent outsiders rather than just using the poor resources he has within the party.

Third, Modi needs a communications strategy czar-cum-advisor who can give him feedback on things going wrong in the national narrative, and fix things that are going out of control. He does not need a conventional media advisor, someone to manage the media, but to think strategically from both the political and public relations perspective. This czar does not have to interact with the media, but has to monitor it for the subliminal messages being sent. He should be organising internal polls to tell Modi how issues are playing out, and their voter impact. Maybe someone is already doing this, but he/she does not seem to be too successful so far in redirecting the narrative.

Fourth, Modi needs to wear his federalist cap more often and explain how responsibilities have changed, with states now having to lead the growth show. The problem is we have been brought up on the Nehru-Gandhi myth that the centre is all-powerful, and for a time it was true under the Gandhi family feudal dictatorship. But this is not the case anymore. Some 62 percent of tax resources are with states, and most crucial portfolios – land, labour, agriculture, health – are state-led. The centre has powers on the concurrent list, but this is more the power to do damage, by doing only populist things with a one-size-fits-all mindset. The UPA did all the damage with bills on Right to Education, Food Security, Land Acquisition, and suchlike things. The states could not oppose populism, and they are now stuck with unworkable national laws that do more harm than good.

Modi needs to explain that his focus will be on the 5-10  things he can do at the centre – defence, diplomacy, macroeconomic management, currency and banking, financial inclusion, subsidy reform and providing basic safety nets for farmers and the poor, telecommunication, railways, national highways, ports, and internal security and intelligence. In other areas, he will facilitate the flow of resources (as in Swachch Bharat, smart cities) and play national cheerleader. Nothing more. These are actually the state’s responsibility, and Modi should make that clear to the public. Even on the issue of improving ease of doing business, he has to say what the states must do and what he can do. The electorate is simply unable to understand whose jobs begins and ends where.

Fifth, he has to set the pace on legal, police and judiciary reforms, even with executive orders. Speeding up police independence, and asking the judiciary to speed up cases needs a rapport with judges and investments in technology, and not too much legislation. It also involves spending more on expanding the police force, investment in crime detection methods, creating a shareable crime database, etc. Executive action backed by wide publicity and sales pitches by Modi hold the keys to these reforms.

The simple reality is this: if Modi wants to win the war and not lose every battle, he has to visibly take charge and talk the walk. Right now he is walking, but not talking enough. He does his work behind the scenes, and makes a few public appearances for launching specific schemes, but he is invisible on the controversial issues of the day, like JNU or Rohith Vemula, till it is too late.

Most important, Modi has to take control of his troops. His Sanghi allies react with anger and emotion to every provocation, and fail to see how much damage mindless action – like what we saw in Patiala House this week – leads. The way to victory is to use the head and keep emotions in check. Cold calculation needs to replace hot-headed responses to emotive issues like the sloganeering at JNU.