In Maps: How To Look At Odisha For 2024

A detailed analysis of electoral results in Odisha mapped to its demographics reveals what was covered by stereotypes.

The stereotypical image of Odisha is one of a province with a hilly, forested, mineral-rich hinterland populated by tribals and wildlife, and a coastal plain bathed in history, and dotted by truly spectacular temples; a land ruled by a wise and popular leader, for decades now, sans strife, rancour, or rival.

The truth, as our assessment shows, is a lot more intricate, a lot more prosaic, and much more intriguing.

A recap of the past three general elections first:

Next, the results map for the 2019 general elections:

And, third, the demographics of the state:

We see that although Scheduled Tribes (STs) constitute nearly a quarter of the population, a heterogeneous agglomeration of Other Backward Castes (OBC) count for nearly half.

In addition, almost a fifth of the population identify as Scheduled Castes (SC). Further, while Christians account for only 3 per cent, we must bear in mind that the actual figure might be a bit higher.

What is the distribution of these various demographics, and how do they influence the electoral outcome in Odisha?

Interestingly, the stereotypes start eroding when we map the 2011 Census data by district, and superimpose the results of the 2019 general elections for effect (Odisha has 21 Lok Sabha seats).

The ST: they are most heavily concentrated in a dozen districts in the hinterland, and have a decisive say in eight parliamentary seats.

In 2019, of the five reserved ST seats, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won two, Naveen Patnaik’s Biju Janata Dal (BJD) won two, and the Congress, one.

Although the SC are distributed fairly evenly across the state, the three reserved SC seats are clustered along the northern Odisha coast.

In 2019, the BJD won all three, with the BJP a close second in two. Readers may note that the ST presence in these three SC reserved seats is minimal.

Now, how do matters look if we map SC plus ST demographics?

Clearly, aggregate concentrations are visibly low in the coastal and delta regions (yellow), and more than 50 per cent (violet) at two opposite ends of the hinterland.

The BJP has done well in the northern inlands in 2019, winning three seats where the SC+ST population is more than 50 per cent — Sundargarh (ST), Sambalpur and Mayurbhanj (ST) (plus Balasore on the coast which has an SC+ST population of around 35 per cent).

It has also extended is vote base to three other seats where the SC+ST population averages around 40 per cent — Bargarh, Bolangir and Kalahandi.

And yet, the BJD won most of the rest. To understand why, let us add on a few more demographics.

A map showing the distribution of Muslims by district indicates that the community is most densely concentrated in the riparian regions of the Mahanadi and the Brahmani, in a belt extending from Cuttack through Jajpur to Bhadrak (which also has a sizeable SC population of 20-30 per cent).

Note how all the seats on this belt are BJD holds. This is where the stereotypes start to erode, and we begin to realise that for all his genteel demeanours, Naveen Patnaik too, benefits from the identity vote.

A good example is Cuttack seat, which the BJP has failed to win, despite attracting most of the Congress vote here.

A fourth factor at work is the Christian vote, which has aided both the BJD and the Congress (the former more than the latter).

To appreciate exactly how this works, a map was generated, combining the demographics of the Christian-plus-SC-plus-ST populations, with parliamentary seat boundaries overlain (outlined in red).

We can now understand why the Congress won Koraput (ST) in 2019, in an intense triangular contest, and also why the BJD has been successful in winning Berhampur and Kandhamal seats (in spite of a BJP surge).

To press the point of identity politics home, note that both these BJD holds are, ironically, general seats.

What are our inferences?

First, the BJP has done a remarkable job over the past decade, of surmounting identity politics in Odisha, equally through persistent grassroots activity, as well as through the efficient implementation of numerous central government schemes which have improved the quality of life in the state.

Here we must make one granular, regional distinction: the dynamics of the northern hinterland are different from that of the southwest which borders Andhra Pradesh.

As a result, while the BJP has successfully cracked the demographics code in the north, it has yet to do so in the southwest. Anecdotal evidence suggests that part of the issue in the latter region is its proximity to the persistent, predatory proselytisation that is encouraged from across the border.

Second, it is clear that the dharmic vote has been triggered in the urban coastal belt, in spite of adverse demographics, particularly in Cuttack. In 2024, it will therefore be unsurprising if the BJP wins both Bhubaneshwar and Puri, and significantly improves its position in Cuttack.

Third, the Congress party’s remnant vote share of 14 per cent is expected to reduce further this year, with part of that going to the BJD, and some to the BJP. However, in the immediate instance, the larger beneficiary would be the BJD, particularly in the Christian-dominant districts.

Fourth, nonetheless, the BJP will simultaneously improve its standing in the rest of the state, at the cost of the BJD. It is, thus, quite possible that with increasing bipolarity, and the exit of the Congress from the electoral stage, that the BJP could win between 11-15 seats in Odisha, with the BJD retaining its primacy in around seven seats.

In conclusion, and having looked beyond stereotypes, we see that Odisha was a palimpsest of identities which the Congress first, and then the BJD, used profitably. But that style of politics is now fraying with the BJP’s success in engineering a supra-caste consolidation.