Victory In 1971: What It Can Teach The World Today

I am spending Vijay Diwas with the BSF Academy at Tekanpore. Of the visit I will write later. More important for the moment is to draw a parallel between the military and strategic connotations of victory denoted by Vijay Diwas with what is going on in the strategic world.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 or so, the traditional balance of power which had helped stabilise the international strategic environment suddenly broke down. Festering ethnic conflicts which had been papered over broke out. This led to much instability in the developing world where these conflicts were existent. The UN, with its agencies and peacekeeping forces was forced to intervene, robustly in some cases under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter even though for humanitarian purposes. Except for Cambodia,  Mozambique and perhaps an odd other mission, these were largely not successful. Mission failure in Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica was particularly marked. While the UN made yeoman efforts at stabilisation of traditional tribal conflicts in Africa, success was generally elusive.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, intervention operations to secure interests of a nation or group of nations have been numerous. The two Gulf Wars, Afghanistan and the Balkans region witnessed prolonged stand offs without commensurate stability as the end result. Mostly this was due to sudden triggers, poor conflict initiation and even worse conflict termination.

The classic examples of Iraq and Afghanistan are before us. The inability to obtain a clearer vision of the future of Iraq and the premature withdrawal has led to the piquant situation in which Iraq is battling for survival and its instability is  spreading to other neighbours. This instability has given rise to the scourge of a rogue organization such as Daesh or ISIS. Similarly, Afghanistan remains unstable and the cause of potential instability in much of the region. No doubt a clear cut victory in the military domain has denied comprehensive conflict termination. However, even in the humanitarian domain, 13 years of presence of multi-national forces has not produced a model of civilian protection.

Much against the scenario presented above, India’s model of intervention for humanitarian reasons, in December 1971, in the former territory of East Pakistan is a model, almost a perfect case study of focused mission and conflict termination.

Admittedly, the environment was very different but no two situations are ever the same in the unpredictable world of conflict. The situation obtaining at that time revolved around the internal conflict which broke out between the two wings of Pakistan on the basis of failed promises, unachieved aspirations of the eastern wing and political, social and cultural differences which were intractable. Internal conflict was inevitable but the vehemence and rabidity of response by the western wing was not.

It surprised the world but the same world was unwilling to intercede on behalf of the unarmed suffering hordes. Killing of intellectuals and rapes reached genocidal proportions and led to a mass influx of refugees in India’s fragile north-eastern border zone. All attempts of the international community to pressurise West Pakistan to put an end to it failed even as internal resistance within then East Pakistan gathered strength. The Pakistan leadership, probably emboldened by its membership of different security alliances, refused to pay heed. India was the most affected state due to the negative effects of conflict directly impinging on its border areas.

The government of India took some measures which in hindsight appear visionary. First, it refused to enter into conflict without looking at all options. Second, it strengthened itself politically through a bilateral 20-year treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union to cover its back in international forums and psychologically dilute Pakistan’s confidence. Third, Gen (later FD Marshal) Sam Manekshaw rendered prolific strategic advice to avoid war unless thrust upon India. In the interim, he chose to strengthen the capability of the armed forces (in cooperation with the CNS and CAS), overcoming equipment issues and psychologically prepared his commanders and troops for possible battle.

Anticipating support of the PLA of China stepping in to support Pakistan, he forced the issue into winter when the northern passes in the Himalayan region would be closed. With that he could pull some of his mountain formations into the plains while risking leaner defences on the Chinese front. With the Prime Minister preparing the diplomatic  ground, the leadership awaited a trigger from Pakistan which came on 3 Dec 1971 in the form of raids on Indian airfields by Pakistan’s Air Force. Pakistan was still living under the illusion of a weak Indian military capability despite the experience of 1965 which it continued to perceive as its victory.

With virtual holding operations on the western front, albeit offensive in nature, the Fd Marshal responded with a campaign designed around speed, maneuver, by pass and exploitation of all dimensions. The availability of local support in the form of the Mukti Bahini was a force multiplier. The Air Force and Navy were marvellous in their own right, restricting Pakistan’s ground capabilities and options. The 14 days war ended on an exceptional note. 93,000 prisoners of war followed an unconditional surrender by Pakistan Army. There was no retribution against the vanquished. All prisoners were transported under escort with protection from any local elements who may have entertained ideas of vendetta. A civil affairs cell was already functioning for some time in close liaison with the Bangladesh government-in-exile. It simply took charge and the civil administration was restored in a matter of days. UN agencies were integrated and relocation of displaced people was undertaken on a war footing.  

Bangladesh was assisted in all fields of soft power which included food and  power. The Indian Army withdrew quickly leaving behind only core elements to oversee reconstruction of essential communications and other infrastructure. The most important aspect of the post war efforts was to give the people of Bangladesh their strategic space and self esteem. This conscious decision perhaps was the most significant achievement of the entire operation.

In retrospect, while translating the sequence of events into military parlance, it appears what won the situation for India was the most adroit conflict initiation practices which bore fruit at the operational and strategic levels. The war fighting apart, the next significant aspect which historians must bear in mind was the singular emphasis on Conflict Termination which was done through the correct usage of strategic diplomacy and soft power.

Bangladesh is a proud nation today with some great achievements to its credit. In my recent visit to Dhaka I could gauge the humility, self respect and gratitude of the people. Not many nations of the world have assisted in the creation of a new nation in a more appropriate way than India.

On Vijay Diwas the nation can be justifiably proud of its achievements of 1971. The Indian Armed Forces continue to hold their heads high and look upon this period as a test of their professionalism and sagacity. In both they came out on top. Jai Hind.