Dilution Of US Military Presence In The Middle East And Afghanistan: Is US Abdicating Its Responsibility?     

Less than a week ago, US President Donald Trump ordered a pullout of all 2,000 American servicemen from Syria and indicated a cut back of 50 per cent of the 14,000 troops present in Afghanistan. The first fallout of the President’s decision was the resignation of US Defence Secretary James Mattis, who opposed it on professional grounds. Mattis, a retired US Marines four star general, was the one man who stood between US strategic pragmatism and pursuance of narrow electoral objectives.

“The fact that Mattis resigned over policy disagreements with the President does not bode well for future trends in Washington from a Gulf Arab perspective,” said Middle East scholar Hussein Ibish. However, with the damage done it is important to assess just what the implications of the presidential decisions are going to be on the not too stable a situation in both the regions. The joint impact on international security is as important to assess.

Taking Syria first, its assessment cannot be divorced from the events in Iraq and rest of the Middle East. The US pulled out a major part of its troops from Iraq in 2011 and yet has nearly 5,000 troops stil stationed there. The pullout in 2011 without ensuring proper conflict termination led to the creation of numerous terrorrelated entities in the region which led to nearly four years of mayhem.

The US presence in Syria was much more guarded, with 2,000 servicemen acting mainly as planners, trainers and support elements. By Trump’s reckoning, there is no longer any need for US presence in Syria because the ISIS is defeated. It leaves open the question whether the ISIS was the only element in the Syrian civil war. With Idlib under assault by Syrian government forces and the likelihood of another round of chemical attacks, leading to major humanitarian impact and a likely outflow of displaced people, was this not considered by Trump as a conflict termination issue?

The same mistakes made by former president Barack Obama are being repeated by Trump ostensibly to recover electoral ground. The pullout does not cater for the Russian and Iranian presence, both physical and proxy, in the Syrian theatre. The Trump decision appears to be based upon the relationship with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS), ostensibly leaving the support for the stabilisation of Syria to the Saudis.

That, the Saudis are neck deep in Yemen and unable to influence an outcome, may not have occurred to him or Jared Kushner, his apparent chief adviser on the Middle East. What the decision does highlight to any observer is a flawed reading of US interests in the Middle East. The other player with major stakes is Israel but with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now politically into survival mode, the influence, already only partial, is unlikely to impact outcomes unless direct threats manifest.

Analysts are assessing the impact on ISIS which is assumed to be dead and ineffective; the situation in Hajin, its supposedly last bastion in Syria, still has the presence of an estimated 5,000 fighters. It remains in a networked state seeking opportunities elsewhere. The main force battling it is the majority Kurdish organisation, the Syrian Defence Force (SDF). The SDF itself is under pressure from Turkey which fears that its victory will give it an out of proportion advantage in the post-civil war scenario and a potential tie-up with Turkish Kurd separatists. Sooner than later the Turkish Army could well enter the theatre further complicating not too clear a situation.

Trump’s decision is going to leave behind a Middle East far more turbulent and to add to it will compromise the position and reputation of the US with its allies and partners elsewhere. On Afghanistan, it will have an equally debilitating effect.

Relating to Afghanistan, Trump had commenced diplomatic parleys with the Taliban through Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. What he has not realised is that a crucial region is being denied to extremist radicalism, a radicalism which could be considered as one of the main threats to international peace. His argument for domestic consumption is ‘America first’, not realising that having acquired and sustained superpower status for long, the US cannot secure itself by placing its troops at its own isolated borders.

No doubt the international community needs to play a greater role, especially when it comes to sharing the financial burden of troop deployment. Of the $130 billion provided to Afghanistan almost $115 billion are from the US coffers. A weakening of Afghan security will have an effect to the second or third order which is something that this decision by Trump has not catered for.

I do believe, however, that cut backs to 7,000 from the current 14,000 troops will not necessarily mean an immediate tottering effect on the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG); provided the right mix of advisers, trainers, operational resources and security is included within the residual force of 7,000.

There appears apprehension that the announced cutback is a part of the Khalilzad diplomacy and caters to confidence building with the Taliban. It does, however, send signals of US reluctance and absence of stomach in Washington to stick it out for the sake of the larger cause of stability, if not peace.

The Taliban will take full advantage of it and it will lead to the empowering of Pakistan to play a role in more negative ways than one. Trump’s avowed aversion for Pakistan and its ways will now have to per force convert to pragmatic cooperation and support if it wishes to utilise its services to negotiate with the Taliban. This, by itself, is going to be a game changer in the region, with negative effect for India.

For better strategic takeaway it is good to mention that the 17-year US presence in Afghanistan may be taken negatively by many. Yet, nobody can deny that this presence also achieved and continues to achieve the denial of freedom to elements ranged against the world at large; it has displaced and partially eliminated the leadership of the Al Qaeda and prevented the conversion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan space into a citadel for Islamic radicals from where they could operate against the world with impunity.

The US has to continue following a policy of supporting the NUG and the two important elements on which it depends – the Afghan National Army (ANA), 174,000 strong and 150,000 strong Afghan National Police (ANP). These forces must continue receiving full support without which it is going to be a romp home for the Taliban Pakistan combine.

The Russians and the Chinese have their interests too, and both are riding on Pakistan for effect, boosting Pakistan’s stature as a regional player. For India it is necessary to play its cards well. It is still an important player in Afghanistan and must project itself as one. It must align itself with the US and the NUG which as a natural course will also lead to some contact with the Taliban.

It is important to reinforce the ANA and ANP’s significance in the current situation and play upon the US to be supportive of this. India must also brace itself for potential violence against its missions in Afghanistan, all supported by Pakistan. There is likely to be no major effect on Jammu and Kashmir except a psychological boost already evident from the monitoring of social media. Yet, intelligence agencies will have to tighten their grip on the potential boost to Pakistani intent to prepare the grounds in the Valley for greater turbulence in the near future.

2019 indeed is emerging as a year of great strategic significance.