Lessons From Ukraine On The Changing Nature Of Warfare

Russia’s victory at the Battle of Bakhmut in May 2023 was a turning point in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who persistently maintained that his side was winning right till the end of the bloody ten-month-long battle, finally had to admit that ‘…today, Bakhmut is only in our hearts’.

Ideally, America and the West should have stopped their senseless proxy war after this defeat, and ordered Ukraine to hold peace talks with Russia, not least because of the horrific scale of casualties, and the destruction of equipment, which the Ukrainian military suffered.

It was now clear to objective analysts that far from being able to win this war, no matter how many tanks or howitzers or missiles they got from the West, Ukraine would never be able to take back the Russian-speaking territories they had lost.

Unfortunately, the opposite happened, and even before the wounds of Bakhmut had begun to heal, Ukraine was instructed to launch a counteroffensive in early June.

This they did, but with disastrous consequences, because, in spite of fierce assaults in some sectors, which continue to date, the Ukrainians have been unable to penetrate the Russians’ first line of defence.

Throughout June, the reports have been of another slaughter of Ukrainian troops, and the widespread destruction of German Leopard main battle tanks, American Bradley troop carriers, artillery guns, and transport vehicles, by the Russians. The leadership of an entire brigade, plus Western mercenaries embedded within, was wiped out by a single missile strike, rendering the formation unfit for operations.

And in that debacle lies an important lesson for Indian war planners.

By late June, Western observers of the failed counter-offensive were forced to admit that a lot of the worst damage was caused by Russian attack-helicopters firing long range anti-tank guided missiles.

The British Ministry of Defence tweeted on 17 June, employing the literary device of understatement as only they can, that “Russia has gained a temporary advantage in southern Ukraine, especially with attack helicopters employing longer-range missiles against ground targets.”

In simple English, this means that the Russians are targeting and destroying Ukrainian armoured vehicles before they reach the frontline to punch a hole through the Russian defences.

The tactic works because Russian attack-helicopters are able to swoop in swiftly towards targets still advancing towards the front, lock on targets already marked by spotter drones, fire their missiles, and then do a quick about-turn to fly back to the safety of Russian air defence systems.

The most commonly used Russian anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) is the Vikhr. It has a range of 10-12 kilometre, which is 20-50 per cent more than other missiles in its class.

It flies faster than other ATGMs, which means that the kinetic energy it unleashes upon impact with its target is a lot more.

The protective armour of a tank doesn’t stand a chance against such a force, as images of Leopard tanks reduced to heaps of broken metal show.

As on date, the Vikhrs have caused so much damage that Ukraine’s much-vaunted counteroffensive has been reduced to largely quasi-positional warfare along a lengthy, heavily-defended Russian frontline, with the Ukrainians scrabbling for minor gains in pockets, while their artillery pounds the Russians.

So, does India have anything similar in its arsenal with which to thwart an armoured attack? No, we don’t, not yet.

What we do have is the Russian-made Ataka ATGM. It has a range of 4-6 kilometre, and can be fired from both our helicopter gunships and armoured personnel carriers.

Readers may note that ATGMs like the Amogha, Invar, Nag, Milan, or Konkurs, which are in service with the Indian Army, have been excluded from this analysis because the focus is on longer-range anti-tank missiles.

It is important that we ask such questions because these missiles would play a central role if ever the main battle tanks and attack helicopters of a primary strike formation like the Ambala-based Kharga Corps, for example, rumbled menacingly across the international border one fine dusk, towards Lahore or Faisalabad; or, conversely, if someone attempted a misadventure onto one of our Chicken’s Necks.

As a short-term interim measure, India purchased limited numbers of the Spike NLOS from Israel in mid-2022 for installation on our helicopter gunships. It has a range of 30 kilometre, which makes it pretty much the deadliest ATGM in service today.

Talks are on between India and Israel for domestic manufacture under the ‘Make-in-India’ policy, but nothing has been finalised yet.

Hearteningly, though, India’s ATGM capabilities are set to soar shortly.

Defence Research Development Organization (DRDO) has successfully developed an ATGM called Helina. It has a range of 7 kilometre and is designed to be launched from the Dhruv — our advanced light helicopter.

The Helina is classified as a third-generation missile because it is guided by an infra-red seeker, but what sets it apart is its ability to wreak havoc at high altitudes on both armour and bunkers.

To put matters in perspective: warriors of the Indian Army had to toil at great personal cost to clear the enemy out of positions like Tiger Hill during the Kargil War of 1999.

Since then, Pakistan has doggedly worked on increasing its ability to conduct combat operations using tanks at high altitudes; in 2019, they drove a tank to over 10,000 feet in a heavily-publicised event, even claiming this feat to be a world record.

It is not, as India has maintained tanks at much higher altitudes for ages, but the point was made.

Yet, this PR-baazi will not amount to much today, because soldiers of the Indian Army will now be going into battle with the support of Helina-carrying Dhruvs — be it in the mountains or the plains.

On 10 January 2023, the Defence Ministry issued fiscal approval for the acquisition of an unspecified number of Helina missiles, and the DRDO website states that these are in the process of being inducted into both the Indian Army and the Air Force.

The Helina, however, pales before what’s soon coming next from DRDO: SANT — the next generation standoff anti-tank missile.

Not only does the SANT have a declared range of 10 kilometre, but it is also fitted with a new, state-of-the-art millimetre-wave seeker which improves accuracy greatly, and a two-way data link which allows the controller to change target coordinates after the missile has been launched.

That puts it firmly in the Vikhr class, although, word on the street is that the SANT’s actual range is 15-20 kilometre. This means that targets can be hit harder, from farther away, while further reducing the risk of exposure to our attack helicopters.

As on date, DRDO has been granted clearance to integrate the SANT with an Mi-35 helicopter gunship for captive and firing trials (captive trials test the seeker and the guidance control algorithms).

This is why defence Twitter has been sharing rumours that the SANT has entered limited production.

When it enters service, the SANT will provide an order-of-magnitude boost to India’s ATGM capabilities. However, as always, the question will be one of volumes, since we need such missiles in the many thousands.

Egypt, for example, ordered a thousand each of the Vikhr and the Ataka in 2016 itself for their Ka-52 attack helicopters. We are already halfway through 2023, and still have no clarity on when the Indian government will start ordering the Helina and the SANT in bulk.

One can only hope that these purchase orders are placed in the coming financial year, because the Helina, for example, is ready to enter mass production.

In the meantime, and as exemplified by the purchase of Israeli Spike NLOS missiles in April 2022, it is expected that as Russia continues to teach Ukraine costly lessons, India will quietly continue to learn them for free.